Фоновое движение: рост неотличим от обычных колебаний.
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Zebra before 4.4.0 contains a consensus divergence vulnerability in V5 transparent signature verification, computing a ZIP-244 digest for SIGHASH_SINGLE inputs lacking corresponding outputs instead of failing. Attackers can craft V5 transactions with fewer outputs than inputs that Zebra accepts and templates via getblocktemplate, producing blocks zcashd rejects.
Zebra zebrad 4.4.0 and zebra-script 6.0.0 fail to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule, accepting V5 transparent inputs signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE that lack a corresponding output. Attackers can broadcast crafted V5 transactions with more inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but zcashd rejects, causing a network consensus split.
Zebra before 6.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows unauthenticated peers to stall Tokio workers by submitting mempool transactions requiring expensive synchronous script verification. Attackers can send non-standard high-sigop P2SH transactions that reach CachedFfiTransaction::is_valid() before standardness checks, saturating the verifier buffer and rendering the node unresponsive.
Zebra zebrad 4.5.0 and zebra-script 7.0.0 count P2SH redeem script signature operations in legacy mode rather than zcashd's accurate P2SH mode, overcounting CHECKMULTISIG preceded by OP_1 through OP_16 as 20 sigops and causing a consensus divergence. Remote attackers can broadcast P2SH spends using low-threshold multisig redeem scripts so that a block zcashd accepts exceeds Zebra's inflated MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS count, causing Zebra nodes to reject it and stall off the chain.
Zebra (zebrad) before 6.2.1 contains an asymmetric resource consumption vulnerability that allows unauthenticated peers to stall block verification by pushing V6 mempool transactions with invalid Halo2 proofs. Attackers can flood the shared unprioritized Halo2 verification queue with zero-fee transactions carrying zero-filled Orchard and Ironwood proofs, causing nodes to fall behind the chain tip.
The block sync download path in Zebra (zebrad) before 6.3.0 reads a block's height from its unvalidated coinbase scriptSig and drops blocks that appear too far behind the tip before consensus validation, without penalizing the supplying peer. Because V5 transaction IDs exclude the scriptSig, a malicious peer can repeatedly serve a canonical block whose coinbase claims height 1 while keeping the requested hash, delaying the node's discovery of the newest block.
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